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Competition for positive attention in financial markets frequently resembles a tournament, where superior
relative performance and greater visibility are rewarded with convex payoffs. We present a rational
expectations model in which firms compete for such positive attention and show that higher competition
for this prize makes discretionary disclosure less likely. In the limit when the market is perfectly competitive,
transparency is minimized. We show that this effect persists when considering general prize structures,
prizes that change in size as a result of competition, endogenous prizes, prizes granted on the basis
of percentile, product market competition, and alternative game theoretic formulations. The analysis
implies that competition is unreliable as a driver of market transparency and should not be viewed
as a panacea that assures self-regulation in financial markets.
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Competition for positive attention in ﬁnancial markets frequently resembles a tournament, where
superior relative performance is rewarded with convex payoﬀs.1 In many settings, rankings drive
renumeration (i.e., order statistics matter). For example, mutual funds that advertise better past
performance or achieve greater visibility experience convex investor ﬂows (e.g., Brown, Harlow,
and Starks, 1996; Berk and Green, 2004; Del Guercio and Tkac, 2008).2 Firms with higher status
attract superior human capital, especially when labor is scarce (e.g., Gatewood, Gowan, and Laut-
enschlager, 1993).3 CEO’s who receive higher public praise are rewarded with positively skewed
payoﬀs (e.g., Gibbs, 1994; Malmendier and Tate, 2009). Such convexity is also likely to exist when
other scarce resources are allocated: supplies and supplier credit, venture capital (e.g., Hsu, 2004),
and investor attention (e.g., Hendricks and Singhal, 1996). In short, there is a prize in the market
for the parties that reveal more favorable information than others.
How then does competition for this prize aﬀect each participants’s incentives to reveal private
information to the public? The answer to this question turns out to be non-obvious. Though it
might seem intuitive that higher competition for such a prize should increase incentives to reveal
private information, we ﬁnd that this is often not the case. Thus, we cannot appeal to the Invisible
Hand to make markets more transparent: while competition may drive prices down in product
markets, it may have the opposite eﬀect on transparency. Based on this, our analysis provides an
important implication for the regulation of ﬁnancial markets: competition should not be viewed as
a panacea to assure information disclosure and self-regulation by participants in the market.4
Summarizing our base model makes it easy to appreciate the intuition for this result. We build
on the model of Dye (1985), where incomplete disclosure results from investors’ uncertainty as to
whether or not management possesses relevant information. In our variant, a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms
compete in the market. All ﬁrms experience a random shock that changes their fundamental value.
Each ﬁrm may or may not observe the precise value of their shock. Firms that make an observation
1As ﬁrst pointed out by Rosen (1981), convex payoﬀs mean that small diﬀerences in performance at the high end
of the spectrum become magniﬁed in larger earnings diﬀerences or returns to eﬀort.
2Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince (1996) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) show that past performance is the crucial
input in investors’ choice of mutual fund. Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) are credited as being the ﬁrst to point
out the tournament-nature of mutual fund markets and the eﬀects this has on managerial incentives. See Berk and
Green (2004) for a theoretical model of convex performance incentives in mutual fund markets. See Gallaher, Kaniel,
and Starks (2005), Gualtieri and Petrella (2005), Del Guercio and Tkac (2008), and Starks and Yates (2008) for the
aﬀects of visibility and reputation on mutual fund ﬂows. See Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) and Gaspar, Massa
and Matos (2006) for the eﬀect that past returns and visibility have on ﬂows to other oﬀerings in fund families.
3See also Chauvin and Guthrie (1994) and Turban and Greening (1996).
4This does not mean that competition can never promote disclosure. Even in our simpliﬁed model we ﬁnd some
exceptions.
1then choose whether to announce it publicly, while ﬁrms with no new information have nothing to
reveal. The ﬁrm with the best announcement gets a ﬁxed prize from the market, which represents
the rank-based convex renumeration previously described.
In the symmetric equilibrium of the game, each ﬁrm with new information applies a threshold
in deciding whether or not to reveal its news. If the observed shock value is above this threshold,
the ﬁrm announces it and competes for the prize. If the observed shock is lower, however, the ﬁrm
conceals its information. The presence of uninformed ﬁrms lends plausible deniability to informed
ﬁrms wishing to conceal a bad observation. Rational investors use Bayesian learning to adjust the
market price of ﬁrms that do not release any news.
Because the probability of winning the prize drops when more ﬁrms compete, the beneﬁt of
making announcements decreases with competition. Therefore, increasing competition leads to
decreased information revelation and lower market transparency. Our base model with a ﬁxed
prize shows this eﬀect most simply and directly, but we show that this eﬀect remains reasonably
robust to other model variations: general reward systems, prizes that change in size as a result of
competition, and product market competition.5
We consider more general reward systems in which multiple prizes are awarded, so that runners-
up also receive compensation. Adding more prizes deﬁnitively increases the incentive to reveal
information, ceteris paribus. However, holding any prize structure ﬁxed, the equilibrium incentive
to reveal private information still decreases with competition because the probability of winning or
being one of the runners-up drops when more ﬁrms are in the market.
We then consider what happens when the size of the prize changes because of competition. When
the size of the prize shrinks, our primary result is magniﬁed. The incentive to reveal information
drops because of two forces: competition for the prize is higher and the reward is lower. Such an
eﬀect is plausible under a number of economic scenarios. For example, as competition for human
resources increases, labor’s bargaining power grows and lowers the value (via higher wages) that the
top ﬁrm gets when winning the competition. Interestingly, though, our results remain surprisingly
robust even when the prize grows with ﬁrm entry. For example, if the prize scales linearly with the
number of participating ﬁrms, competition still has a negative inﬂuence on information revelation
when the number of competing ﬁrms exceeds a modest threshold. In fact, competition reduces
disclosure unless the prize grows at least exponentially in the number of ﬁrms.
5In Appendix B, we build on this and show that this consideration is robust when considering endogenous prizes,
prizes awarded based on percentile, and a sequential disclosure game structure (instead of the simultaneous game
modeled in the paper). There, we also consider the eﬀect of volatility on the tendency for ﬁrms to disclose private
information.
2We then consider the eﬀect of product market competition on the analysis. In our base model,
all ﬁrms draw their shocks from a common distribution which does not change with the number of
competing ﬁrms. That is, the entry of a new competitor reduces a ﬁrm’s chance to win the prize,
but does not reduce its earnings. To include this eﬀect, we alter our model by scaling the value of
ﬁrms and shocks to ﬁrm value downward with competition. This agnostic framework allows us to
analyze how competition aﬀects information revelation without limiting ourselves to any particular
model of pricing and supply. We ﬁnd this modiﬁcation mitigates the tendency for competition
to reduce information revelation when a very small number of ﬁrms compete. However, once the
number of ﬁrms reaches a critical mass, further competition reduces information transmission as in
the base model. We provide analytic proof and numerical examples to show that this critical mass
of ﬁrms is very small, and conjecture that most industries are large enough that further competition
generally reduces ﬁrms’ incentives to reveal private information. Though according to the model, in
the limit when the market becomes perfectly competitive, proﬁts converge to zero but transparency
is minimized.
The analysis yields novel and testable empirical predictions. Our model predicts that perfor-
mance announcements, advertising, and discretionary disclosure should decline with competition,
ceteris paribus. This implies, for example, that in the mutual fund industry where ﬁrms compete
for Morningstar ratings (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2008), advertising expenditure and discretionary
disclosure should be negatively correlated with Herﬁndahl Index. Such a prediction might be tested
cross-sectionally or with a time series, while controlling for other fund characteristics. Our model
also predicts that when asymmetric information increases, discretionary disclosure should increase
in industries with low status-based prizes. However, in industries with high status rewards, dis-
cretionary disclosure should decline when information asymmetry increases. This prediction might
also be tested in the mutual fund industry with a time-series that includes periods of high volatility.
This paper contributes to a large literature on information revelation and discretionary disclo-
sure in ﬁnancial markets. The paper that is closest to ours is Fishman and Hagerty (1989), which
shows that ﬁrms compete for attention in ﬁnancial markets because informed trading leads to price
eﬃciency, which is valuable for ﬁrms making investment decisions. The prize in their paper is price
eﬃciency. In fact, Fishman and Hagerty show that ﬁrms spend more on disclosure than is socially
optimal when competing for the prize. Our paper adds to theirs in the following way: when more
and more ﬁrms compete for this type of attention, each ﬁrm’s ability to achieve price eﬃciency
declines because traders have a ﬁxed bandwidth when following ﬁrms. Decreasing marginal beneﬁt
to disclosure relative to its cost, makes disclosure less attractive. Therefore, applying our model to
3the formulation in Fishman and Hagerty (1989), we would predict that their eﬀect would diminish
with more competition.
Early work on disclosure theory suggest that market forces are suﬃcient to induce full disclosure.
Grossman and Hart (1980), Grossman (1981), and Milgrom (1981) suggest that in the absence of
disclosure costs or asymmetric information, ﬁrms adhere to the Full Disclosure Principle. That is,
when ﬁrms have private information about their prospects, adverse selection prompts high-valued
ﬁrms to distinguish themselves from others by disclosing their information. In so doing, they reduce
the expected prospects of the remaining non-disclosing ﬁrms. The eﬀect cascades, ﬁnally resulting
in full disclosure by all ﬁrms. Diamond (1985) shows that such disclosure is welfare-improving
because of explicit information cost savings and improved risk sharing.
Subsequent work challenges these results: full disclosure may not occur because disclosure is
costly (e.g. Verrecchia 1983; Fishman and Hagerty 1990), some market participants are unsophis-
ticated (e.g., Fishman and Hagerty 2003), or the market is unsure whether ﬁrms have asymmetric
information (Dye, 1985 and Jung and Kwon, 1988). We build our model on Dye (1985) and Jung
and Kwon (1988), but we could just as well have used Verreccia (1983) for our foundation. In either
case the prospect of a prize increases the incentive to disclose, and growing competition reduces
that incentive. While we use Dye’s model as a matter of choice, our result generalizes to alternative
models of discretionary disclosure.
Our work also adds to the literature on product market competition and discretionary disclo-
sure. Again, this literature is split on whether product market competition increases or decreases
disclosure. Stivers (2004) argues that product market competition increases disclosure, as ﬁrms
might even make negative disclosures if doing so will hurt competitors more. In contrast, Wagen-
hofer (1989), Darrough (1993), Clinch and Verrecchia (1997), and Board (2009) argue that ﬁrms
may avoid disclosure to conceal private information from competitors. Similarly, Darrough and
Stoughton (1990), Feltham and Xie (1992), and Pae (2002) argue that ﬁrms may conceal such
private information to prevent new entry into the market. Finally, Dye and Sridhar (1995) ﬁnd
that product market competition may increase or decrease disclosure depending on whether the
information the ﬁrms receive is private or industry-related. In many of these papers, disclosure
itself aﬀects the nature of competition, which in turn aﬀects the tendency to disclose. While we do
not address these considerations speciﬁcally, we do add to this literature by considering product
market competition simultaneously with competition for attention, ﬁnding again that increased
competition often reduces management’s tendency to reveal private information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our base model, the action
4set presented to ﬁrms, and the corresponding payoﬀs. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium
and explores key comparative statics. We show the results are robust to more generalized prize
structures, and to changing sizes of the prize with competition. In Section 4, we add product
market competition to the model. We show that competing for the same resources, customers, etc.
can initially lead to an increase in information revelation, but once the number of ﬁrms reaches an
economically reasonable level, additional competition leads to less disclosure. Section 5 oﬀers some
concluding remarks. Proofs of all propositions are deferred to Appendix A, as are some technical
deﬁnitions and lemmas. In Appendix B, we show that our results remain robust when considering
a sequential game set-up, volatility, endogenous prizes, and prizes awarded based on percentile.
2 Base Model
We consider a single period model in which a group of N risk-neutral ﬁrms, indexed by j ∈
{1,...,N}, compete in a game of discretionary “disclosure”.6 Each ﬁrm experiences a random
change in fundamental valuation, ˜ xj ∼ F. We assume ˜ xj has a probability density function f(x) > 0
for all x ∈ R, and that E[˜ xj] = 0. Realizations are independent and identically distributed for each
ﬁrm, and their distribution does not depend on the number of ﬁrms competing in the market,
though we will relax this assumption in Section 4.
In each ﬁrm, a manager observes the true realization of ˜ xj with probability p. With probability
(1 − p), the manager observes nothing. The parameter p measures the degree of asymmetric
information in the market. When p is high, it is likely that ﬁrms have more information about
their value than outsiders. When p is low, it is unlikely that ﬁrms have learned anything new. As
such, p is also a measure of strong form market (in-)eﬃciency.
Deﬁnition 1. The possible information events are
Ij ≡ ﬁrm j is informed of ˜ xj
Uj ≡ ﬁrm j remains uninformed of ˜ xj.
Firms that observe ˜ xj may either conceal its value, or may credibly reveal it to investors. Firms
that do not observe a value are not permitted to fabricate one. Implicitly, we suppose that investors
6Our use of quotes is purposeful here because what we have in mind is more general than solely accounting
disclosure alone. Disclosure is meant to refer to any instance in which information might be revealed. Likewise,
our use of “ﬁrm” here is meant to represent any party that competes in the market for attention, which includes
individuals (e.g., CEO’s).
5can freely verify and penalize false claims of ˜ xj, but cannot determine whether a non-disclosing
ﬁrm is in fact concealing information.7
Deﬁnition 2. If ﬁrm j is informed, its available actions are {Dj,Cj}, where
Dj ≡ ﬁrm j discloses its observation xj
Cj ≡ ﬁrm j conceals its observation xj.
The event that ﬁrm j either conceals its observation or is legitimately uninformed is given by Pj
(i.e., ﬁrm j pools).
For the moment, we allow ﬁrms to choose non-deterministic strategies, although we will soon
show deterministic strategies are dominant, almost surely. Formally, we describe each ﬁrm’s strat-
egy by a “disclosure policy.”
Deﬁnition 3. An informed ﬁrm j determines its action using a disclosure policy, a mapping
σj : R → [0,1]. Given any observation x ∈ R, ﬁrm j, discloses with probability σj(x) and conceals
with probability 1 − σj(x).
All informed ﬁrms act simultaneously and without knowing which of their competitors are also
informed. What we have in mind is that a market-wide event arises in which investors expect
informed ﬁrms to make disclosures over a short time horizon.8 We deﬁne σ ≡ {σ1,...,σN} as the
collection of strategies used by all ﬁrms in the market. After acting, each falls into one of three
categories: uninformed ﬁrms, informed ﬁrms that reveal information, and informed ﬁrms that pool
with the uninformed.
Investors are competitive, risk-neutral, and have rational expectations about ﬁrm behavior. If
ﬁrm j pools (event Pj), investors weigh the odds that it is uninformed against the odds that it
is concealing a poor xj and adjust its price by Bayesian inference. Firm utility is determined by
these price changes, so this expectation is also the utility an informed ﬁrm obtains by concealing
its information,
uC
j ≡ E[˜ xj|Pj,σ,p].
7As such, we follow the previous literature on discretionary disclosure and do not consider the ﬁrms’ tendency to
make false statements here. To address this, an alternative set-up might include a cheap talk game (e.g., Crawford
and Sobel, 1982), but we do not analyze this directly.
8However, in Appendix B we explore a sequential game of disclosure and show that the frequency of disclosure of
private information is minimized as N → ∞.
6After all disclosures have been made, investors award a prize φ to the ﬁrm with the highest
disclosed value. This prize value represents the convex gain in value that accrue to the high-
performing ﬁrm. We take this prize to be given exogenously, but consider what happens when this
prize is endogenously determined in Appendix B. There we show that our primary result still holds.
Including this exogenous prize, ﬁrm j’s expected utility of revealing x is
uD
j (x) ≡ x + φWj(x),
where we deﬁne Wj(x) as the probability that ﬁrm j has the highest disclosure. This value depends
on the probability p of competing ﬁrms being informed, and on the strategies σ−j they employ.
Therefore, this model extends the Jung and Kwon (1988) reﬁnement of the Dye (1985) model, in
which uncertainty about a single ﬁrm’s information induces an incomplete disclosure equilibrium.
Dye’s model corresponds to ours in the speciﬁc case where we have only one ﬁrm and no prize
(N = 1 and φ = 0).
3 Equilibrium Disclosure
With Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, we determine the game’s unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1. In any subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, each ﬁrm acts according to a disclosure
threshold tj < 0,
σj(xj) =
(
1 for xj > tj
0 for xj < tj.
The threshold is implicitly deﬁned by the condition that a ﬁrm observing xj = tj be indiﬀerent
between disclosing and concealing,
uD
j (tj) = uC
j .
According to Lemma 1, each informed ﬁrm simply compares the expected utility it can obtain
by revealing information to what it obtains by pooling. If it conceals its signal, then the actual
realization certainly cannot aﬀect the valuation investors assign, so uC
j is constant with respect to
the observed value xj. In contrast, the value obtained by revealing information is increasing in
xj. If the two utilities are equal when the ﬁrm observes its threshold value ˜ xj = tj, then the ﬁrm
should reveal any observation greater than tj and conceal any lesser observation.
Note that the threshold tj is lower than the distribution mean, which we’ve assumed to be zero.
The average ˜ xj for an uninformed ﬁrm is simply the distribution mean, and because ﬁrms disclose
their best observations, rational investors expect the average concealed observation to be negative.
7The weighted average assigned to herding ﬁrms must therefore be below the distribution mean.
Since disclosure yields strictly greater utility than the value disclosed, no ﬁrm will ever conceal
an above-average observation. So if ﬁrm j is indiﬀerent between revealing and concealing a value
xj = tj, then tj < 0.
Lemma 2. Every ﬁrm uses the same disclosure threshold, deﬁned as t∗.
In other words, there cannot be an equilibrium in which some ﬁrms are more “honest” than oth-
ers. This is not too surprising, since all ﬁrms draw the observations from identical and independent
distributions. One can imagine an alternate model in which there was some endogenous beneﬁt
of being perceived as trustworthy, and such a model might induce a heterogeneous equilibrium.
In our equilibrium, Lemma 2 ensures that any two ﬁrms will behave identically with any given
observation.
This result justiﬁes our description of the non-disclosing ﬁrms as a “pool.” Since they all
have identical disclosure thresholds and distributions F, investors value all non-disclosing ﬁrms
identically. In a hypothetical equilibrium where some ﬁrms are more honest, investors would
assign a higher valuation to an honest non-disclosing ﬁrm than to a ﬁrm that has a reputation for
concealing poor valuations. But when no ﬁrm distinguishes itself by its honesty, investors assign
the same value uC to every non-disclosing ﬁrm in the pool.
Lemma 3. The common disclosure threshold t∗ is unique.
Not only does each individual ﬁrm have a unique optimal response to the other ﬁrms’ strategies,
but there is only one viable choice for the entire group. So for given model parameter values, we can
theoretically determine the unique disclosure threshold. This allows us to predict how disclosure
behavior responds to exogenous parameter changes. Most importantly, we will demonstrate how
equilibrium disclosure responds to an increase in the number of competing ﬁrms.
Taken together, Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 establish Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique and non-trivial subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, in which
every ﬁrm discloses according to a common threshold t∗ deﬁned implicitly by
t∗ + φ
￿
1 − p + pF(t∗)
￿N−1 =
p




Further, the threshold t∗ lies below the unconditional mean of ˜ xj, i.e. t∗ < 0.
The left side of (1) can be understood as the utility a ﬁrm that observes ˜ xj = t∗ expects if
it reveals its information. The ﬁrm immediately receives its own value ˜ xj = t∗, and can also win
8the prize φ if its disclosure is the highest. But since competing ﬁrms never reveal values below
t∗, any other disclosing ﬁrm will have a higher value almost surely. Firm j can win, therefore,
only if all other ﬁrms pool. Each competing ﬁrm pools if either it is uninformed or it is informed
with an observation below the threshold. These events occur with probabilities (1−p) and pF(t∗),
respectively. The left side therefore is the uD
j (t∗) term from Lemma 1.
The right side is utility a ﬁrm obtains by concealing its observation, which equals the expected
value change of a pooling ﬁrm. Such a ﬁrm could be uninformed and have a zero expected value for
its observation, or could be hiding an observation lower than the threshold. The weighted average
of these possibilities yields the right side of Equation 1.
3.1 Comparative Statics
Proposition 1 implicitly deﬁnes the equilibrium disclosure threshold t∗, so we could now proceed
by using the Implicit Function Theorem to determine comparative statics on t∗. But the economic
interpretation of t∗ is not immediately obvious, and it is not clear what empirical predictions can
be made from it. A more useful characterization is the frequency with which ﬁrms opt to reveal
private information. That is, what is the ex ante probability that a ﬁrm, if it observes its value
change, will choose to share its observation with investors?
Deﬁnition 4. We deﬁne the equilibrium ex ante probability of an informed ﬁrm disclosing by
ω∗ ≡ Pr(D|I).
We refer to this probability as the equilibrium disclosure frequency. Since the equilibrium is
symmetric, we omit ﬁrm-speciﬁc subscripts.
When ﬁrms follow threshold disclosure strategies, as described in Lemma 1, there is a one-to-one
relationship between the disclosure threshold and the corresponding disclosure frequency,
ω∗ = Pr(˜ x > t∗) = 1 − F(t∗).
Note that disclosure threshold and frequency move in opposite directions. That is, if a ﬁrm lowers
its threshold, it discloses more of its realized values, and vice-versa.




ˆ ω x(Ω) dΩ
1 − pˆ ω
. (2)
9Let ˆ t be the corresponding disclosure threshold, used in equilibrium when φ = 0, so that




Dye (1985) and Jung & Kwon (1988) consider disclosure with no strategic interaction (i.e., N =
1) and no prize φ. Their equilibrium condition is equivalent to Equation 2. The chance to win
φ > 0 oﬀers ﬁrms a greater incentive to disclose, so in equilibrium, we have
ω∗ ≥ ˆ ω ∀φ ≥ 0,∀N < ∞.
That is, ˆ ω is a lower bound for ω∗ over all φ and N. In fact, it is the largest possible lower bound.
Note that ˆ t is similarly an upper bound for t∗, which by Proposition 1 must lie below E[˜ x] = 0. We
therefore also have
t∗ ≤ ˆ t < 0 ∀φ ≥ 0,∀N < ∞.
Because ω∗ and t∗ are informationally equivalent, we may conduct our investigation using either
variable. We therefore rewrite Proposition 1 in terms of disclosure frequency, instead of a disclosure
threshold.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique and non-trivial subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, in which
every ﬁrm discloses its highest observations with a common disclosure frequency ω∗ deﬁned implic-
itly by





F−1(1 − Ω) dΩ. (3)
Furthermore, ω∗ > ˆ ω.
Like Proposition 1, this proposition deﬁnes the equilibrium frequency ω∗ by an indiﬀerence
between disclosure and non-disclosure for a ﬁrm that observes the threshold value, ˜ x = t(ω∗).
Proposition 3. Equilibrium disclosure frequency is:
(i) decreasing in the number of competing ﬁrms, N.
(ii) increasing in the prize value, φ.
Further, as N → ∞, ω∗ converges to ˆ ω.
Proposition 3(i) is the simplest possible statement of our main result. When ﬁrms disclose
competitively to win positive attention, increased competition reduces disclosure. This deﬁes the
general economic intuition that tightening competition drives ﬁrms to give up their small advantages
10in the interest of providing a competitive product. Rather, increasing competition drives ﬁrms to
hoard their informational advantage over investors. The result has immediate application in the
ﬁnancial sector, where disclosure is critical and where top-performing ﬁrms enjoy large rewards.
Mathematically, the cause of the competition eﬀect is straightforward. As more ﬁrms enter
the market, each ﬁrm’s chance of making the highest disclosure diminishes. With it, their chances
of receiving positive attention from their disclosure decreases. Since the disclosure decision is a
trade-oﬀ between the desire to win the prize and the desire to conceal bad signals, additional ﬁrm
entry tips the balance in favor of concealing. In the sections that follow, we will show this eﬀect to
be robust to more sophisticated model speciﬁcations.
Proposition 3(ii) states simply that ﬁrms will be more inclined to disclose when the prize they
can win is large. Again, a larger prize tips the balance between the competing desires to pool and
to compete openly for positive investor attention. This concept is also robust to our alternative
model speciﬁcations.
Finally, according to Proposition 3, once the market for attention becomes perfectly competi-
tive, equilibrium disclosure is minimized. Moreover, the frequency with which ﬁrms disclose their
information approaches that when there is no prize in the market whatsoever. Therefore, perfect
competition induces ﬁrms to retain the maximum degree of asymmetric information and market
transparency is minimized.
The comparative statics in p turn out to be trickier. Jung and Kwon (1988) consider the special
case where N = 1 and φ = 0, and ﬁnd disclosure to be strictly increasing in p. We are able to
conﬁrm this result by computing our comparative statics with φ = 0. But when there is a prize,
the situation becomes more complicated.
Hypothetically, if p increases and ﬁrms fail to adjust their disclosure strategies, there would be
two sources of change in ﬁrm utility. First, the increase in asymmetric information would increase
the Bayesian probability of a ﬁrm having inside information. Rational investors would respond by
reducing their assessment uC of pooling ﬁrms. Second, the increase in p means competing ﬁrms
are more likely to be informed. Since being informed is a prerequisite to disclosing, the increase in
p makes any given disclosing ﬁrm less likely to win the prize by default. Mathematically, a higher
p decreases Wj(x), which implies a lower expected utility of disclosure.
These two eﬀects of increased p work against each other. To determine whether ω∗ will increase
or decrease, we need to know which of these eﬀect impact ﬁrm utility more. If the reduction in
uC(ω∗) is larger than the reduction in uD(ω∗), then disclosure becomes more appealing. Firms
will then respond to an increase in p by disclosing more frequently. Conversely, if the reduction in
11uD(ω∗) dominates, then ﬁrms respond with less frequent disclosure.
If the prize value φ is small or zero, then the reduction in Wj(x) is unimportant, so the reduction
in uC(ω∗) dominates, and equilibrium disclosure increases. This echoes the Jung and Kwon (1988)
result. The same result follows when N is very large, in which case the probability of winning the
prize is low from the outset. In contrast, when φ is large and N is modest, the reduction in Wj(x)
is critical. The second eﬀect dominates, so overall the incentive to disclose is reduced more than
the incentive to pool. Consequently, ﬁrms pool more often, reducing the equilibrium disclosure
frequency.
3.2 Generalized Prize Structure
We now show that competition’s eﬀect of reducing disclosure is robust to alternative model spec-
iﬁcations. Because the probability of winning φ declines exponentially with ﬁrm entry, the eﬀect
tends to trump other simultaneous considerations, especially when N is large. Neither multiple
prizes nor prizes that decrease with competition alter this result. Prizes that grow with N can
change things, but only for small N or for prizes that (rather implausibly) grow exponentially ad
inﬁnitum.
3.2.1 Multiple Prizes
Allowing only a single ﬁrm to win the prize φ has simpliﬁed our analysis, but it seems reasonable
for the second-highest discloser to receive some positive investor attention as well. Perhaps the top
ten ﬁrms all deserve some sort of status prize.
There are situations where having a single prize makes sense. In industries with natural
monopoly, or where the government awards a single contract, ﬁrms like Microsoft and Raytheon
might be entitled to such such a winner-take-all prize. In such ﬁelds the runners-up receive little if
any reward from their second-place, and a single-prize model is best.
But a more egalitarian prize structure is sensible if ﬁrms are limited by capacity or distribution
constraints. A single grocery store cannot service the entire state, regardless of how acclaimed its
fresh produce may be. In such cases, some prize should be reserved for the ﬁrms with slightly less
impressive disclosures. In what follows, we consider that a ﬁnite number of prizes K are awarded
to the top ﬁrms. In Appendix B we show that the analysis remains robust to considering prizes
awarded by percentile.
Deﬁnition 6. A disclosure game with a progressive prize structure is one in which the ﬁrms
that make the K highest disclosures each win a prize. The ﬁrm that makes the kth highest disclosure
12wins φk. We require the prizes to be positive and strictly monotonic,
φ1 > φ2 > ... > φK > 0.
Compared to a model with a single prize of φ = φ1, the addition of prizes for runners-up
naturally induces greater disclosure. But although the change to a progressive prize structure may
increases disclosure for any particular N, our central result remains unchanged:
Proposition 4. Under any particular progressive prize structure, equilibrium disclosure frequency
strictly decreases as competition increases. That is, ω∗
N+1 < ω∗
N for any N.
This result justiﬁes our simpliﬁcation in working with a single prize φ. Although additional
prizes may change the quantitative predictions of equilibrium disclosure, the qualitative comparative
statics remain unchanged. The chance of winning a lesser prize decreases with competition just as
the chance of winning a single prize does. Competition therefore reduces disclosure in this setup
as well.
3.2.2 Increasing/Decreasing Prize Values
A further objection to our model might be that we constrain the prize value to remain constant.
One reasonable alternative is to allow the prize value to vary with N. Indeed, a reasonable case
might be made for either increasing or decreasing prize values.
Prize value might decrease when additional ﬁrms enter because investor attention is diluted over
a larger population of ﬁrms. More commonly, though, the prize might shrink because of increasing
competition for a scarce resource. For example, as competition for bank ﬁnancing, supplier credit,
or labor resources increases, the relative bargaining power of these residual claimants grows, thereby
lowering the value that the top ﬁrm gets when winning the competition.
In response to this argument, we note simply that a prize that decreases in N only augments
our result. If the addition of further competitors causes an exogenous reduction of prize value
(i.e., lower φ), then equilibrium disclosure falls even faster then if the prize remained constant.
The argument that prizes should increase with competition is a more challenging one. Such
a case can be made when disclosures are easy to compare, and when choosing the very best ﬁrm
has high value to potential clients and investors. One might argue that investment funds ﬁt this
description. A single fund can accommodate large increases in the amount of money it manages,
and there is very little reason to be content with the second best fund (net of fees, at least). If
potential investors believe that the disclosed information is a strong predictor of future performance
13(e.g., Berk and Green, 2004), then being the best in a large ﬁeld of competitors may bring a larger
prize than being the best in a small ﬁeld.
We concede that a continuously increasing prize value can overcome the eﬀect of competition, at
least when N is small. But the following proposition shows that unless the prize grows exponentially
by a factor of at least 1/(1 − pˆ ω), disclosure will eventually decrease once N reaches some critical
value.






1 − pˆ ω
, (4)
then there exists some N ∈ R such that N > N implies that ω∗
N+1 < ω∗
N.









1 − pˆ ω
,
so the condition in (4) is satisﬁed, and disclosure decreases with competition for large N.
Intuitively, the chance of winning the prize declines exponentially in N, so unless the prize
grows forever at the same exponential rate, the expected winnings will eventually decline in N.
One must ask, however, where a prize that increases exponentially with ﬁrm entry would come
from. The value of high status may well increase exponentially as the number of competing ﬁrms
increases from, say N = 1 to N′ = 10. But it is diﬃcult to believe the same exponential increase
could continue from N = 10 to N′ = 50. We conjecture that exponentially increasing status prizes
are uncommon at best, and may never occur in industries with a large number of ﬁrms.
3.3 Implications for Regulation
In most markets, transparency and truthful disclosure increase welfare for several reasons. Disclo-
sure improves explicit information cost savings and allows for better risk sharing (Diamond, 1985).
Disclosure also improves the allocation and use of scarce resources because informed trading leads
to price eﬃciency (Fishman and Hagerty, 1989). Finally, transparency and disclosure make tradable
assets more liquid because of decreased adverse selection in the market (Diamond and Verrecchia,
1991).
14From the results presented so far, it is easy to appreciate that competition for attention may
make markets less transparent, which can lower welfare through these mechanisms. This is espe-
cially true in settings where such competition resembles a tournament. For example, our analysis
predicts that in the mutual fund market, as more ﬁrms compete for recognition (e.g., Morningstar
ratings), fewer funds will make discretionary disclosure and may even attempt to reduce the clarity
of their fund attributes (e.g., Carlin, 2009). This may make it harder for retail investors to make
optimal initial allocations or rebalance their investments, and may even lead to decreased market
participation (Carlin and Manso, 2010).
It is important to note that our results here are not special because we build on the models
of Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988). Indeed, other formulations could be used to generate
similar ﬁndings. For example, consider the ﬁxed cost of disclosing as in Verrecchia (1983). As the
beneﬁt to competing for the prize drops with competition, so would the incentive to disclose. That
is, in a competitive market ﬁrms would be less willing to pay a cost to reveal private information.
As such, we view our results with suﬃcient generality as they do not depend on the particular
formulation we use.
Our results, then, should give policy makers pause when relying on competitive forces to induce
market transparency. Especially, in settings that resemble a tournament, competition may make
transparency worse, which may cause a decline in welfare. Clearly, while we do not wish to portray
this ﬁnding as a tautology—indeed, there exist some settings in which competition does induce
ﬁrms to reveal private information—it does suggest that market forces alone are often insuﬃcient
to maximize welfare in the market. This emphasizes the idea that regulation likely has a role in
ﬁnancial markets.
4 Disclosure Under Product Market Competition
Our base model is most appropriate for ﬁrms that compete for the prize only indirectly. That
is, it models the competition for φ between ﬁrms in diﬀerent industries, such as Facebook and
Google. Although such ﬁrms don’t compete directly for customers or revenue, they both vie for
the same status-based prize: being seen as the premiere internet destination. The base model is
less appropriate when comparing, say, Microsoft and Apple, which compete directly in the product
market, as well as for attention through their disclosures.
In this section, we present an alternative model that better characterizes the latter case. That
is, we suppose that ﬁrms compete for customers as well as for positive attention from investors.
15The fundamental aspect of competition relevant here is that ﬁrm revenue decreases with the entry
of additional ﬁrms. Accordingly, signals that aﬀect ﬁrm value have a smaller absolute impact, even
if they alter ﬁrm value by the same fraction. For example, an internal audit that reveals an increase
in eﬃciency has a greater absolute eﬀect if it happens in a ﬁrm with high revenue and market value.
4.1 Simple Product Market Competition
To capture this eﬀect simply, we model product market competition by using a distribution of value
signals that becomes compressed with the entry of additional ﬁrms. When N ﬁrms compete in the
product market as well as for investor attention, we exchange the original distribution of signals
x ∼ F for a compressed distribution xN ∼ FN. Speciﬁcally, whenever a ﬁrm would have drawn a
signal x in the original model, they instead draw a scaled-down event x/N in the new model.
Formally, we write the new distribution as
FN(x) ≡ F(Nx).
An increase in N has the eﬀect of “squishing” the distribution of news events while leaving the
support unchanged. If x = $10k had been a 90th-percentile result with N = 5, x = $1k would be
the new 90th-percentile with N = 50. Increasing N scales down expectations while preserving the
concavity and any other peculiarities of the value distribution. We refer to this as “equal shares
competition” for earnings.
We wish to stress that this is not intended as a realistic model of competition. A plethora
of microeconomic papers have dealt with such issues before us, so we initially gloss over other
aspects of pricing, capital, and entry costs. Our goal is simply to show how the value-scaling eﬀect
of competition aﬀects disclosure, using the simplest model that captures the relevant eﬀect. In
Section 4.2, though, we consider more general models of competition, and show that our general
result holds for most plausible models of competition and revenue.
We have already addressed the comparative statics of the base model in Section 2. There we
found that as N increases, the incentive to disclose falls as the probability of winning the prize
decreases. This reduces the incentive to disclose. With product market competition potential
revenue declines as well. This reduces the incentive to pool. These two eﬀects oppose one another.
Which eﬀect dominates depends upon the number of competing ﬁrms.
For what values of N, then, does competition reduce disclosure? If we were to ﬁnd the necessary
number of ﬁrms to be in the millions, for example, then our point here would only be academic
16and not of practical import. To gain a sense of how many ﬁrms is “enough,” consider the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. If N > 1/(pˆ ω), then ω∗
N+1 < ω∗
N. Further, as N → ∞,
(i) Average per-ﬁrm earnings πN converge to zero.
(ii) The equilibrium disclosure frequency ω∗
N converges to ˆ ω.
To appreciate Proposition 1, suppose the distribution ˜ x ∼ F is symmetric, so the fact that
ˆ t < E[x] implies that
ˆ ω = 1 − F(ˆ t) > 1 − F (E [x]) = 0.5. (5)
Then the necessary condition becomes N > 2/p. If, for example, ﬁrm information arrives with
probability 20%, then N = 2/(20%) = 10 ﬁrms is enough competition that further entry will only
reduce disclosure. The higher p is, the fewer ﬁrms that are required to assure that further com-
petition decreases disclosure. We conjecture that in many industries (e.g., ﬁnancial sectors), there
are already enough competitors present so that disclosure responds negatively to additional com-
petition.
Proposition 1 also shows that ω∗
N actually converges to ˆ ω under perfect competition, while
industry proﬁts converge to zero. In most Microeconomic models, as in ours, producer surplus falls
to zero under perfect competition. Product prices generally converge to their lowest possible values,
which maximizes social welfare. However, perfect competition in disclosure induces ﬁrm to retain
their maximum degree of asymmetric information. Thus, while perfect competition drives product
prices to their most socially eﬃcient, it drives ﬁrm prices to their least informationally eﬃcient. To
better appreciate this, we provide the following example.
Example 1. Consider the disclosure game where ˜ x is Gaussian with µ = 0, σ = 5 and φ = 1,
p = .3 and product market competition characterized by FN(x) = F(Nx). Figure 1 shows how the
equilibrium disclosure changes with the number of competing ﬁrms. Disclosure initially increases,
then decreases asymptotically to the lower limit ˆ ω ≈ .556.
Although the above condition of N > 1/(pˆ ω) is mild enough, the condition is indeed only
suﬃcient for competition to decrease disclosure, not necessary. Typically, an even smaller number
of ﬁrms will suﬃce. We therefore derive the constraint on N that is both necessary and suﬃcient
for further entry to reduce disclosure.








Figure 1: Disclosure game with product market competition. The random variable is ˜ x ∼ N(0,5)
and φ = 1 and p = .3. The product market competition characterized by FN(x) = F(Nx). The
curve shows how the equilibrium disclosure changes with the number of competing ﬁrms. Disclosure
initially increases, then decreases asymptotically to the lower limit ˆ ω ≈ .556.
Consider the position of a ﬁrm j that draws the threshold value, xj = F−1(1 − ω∗). With N
ﬁrms competing for the prize, ﬁrm j is indiﬀerent between disclosing and herding. If a (N + 1)th
competitor enters, and ﬁrm j observes the same xj, how do the ﬁrm’s prospects change? Should it
disclose, the entry reduces its expected prize winnings by a factor of (1 − pω) because
φW(ω;N) = φ(1 − pω)N−1 (6)
is exponentially decreasing in N. But the other terms, F−1
N (1 − ω) and uC
N(ω), decline by a factor
of N/(N + 1), as demonstrated in Lemma A2 in the appendix. As N rises, then, this linear eﬀect
diminishes in signiﬁcance compared to the exponential eﬀect on the expected prize value. Intuitively
it seems that there is a critical number of ﬁrms at which additional competition makes herding
more attractive than competing for the prize.
Proposition 6. Disclosure frequency decreases with ﬁrm entry if and only if the number of com-






≡ N ⇐⇒ ω∗
N+1 < ω∗
N. (7)
Because the ex-ante probability of a ﬁrm disclosing is P(Dj|N) = pω∗







That is, if N exceeds the threshold speciﬁed by the relative probabilities of disclosing and
pooling, then the exponential eﬀect overwhelms the linear eﬀect. So, the net eﬀect of ﬁrm entry
18is a reduction in the incentive to disclose, which results in ω∗
N+1 < ω∗
N. Note, however, that the
threshold for N established by Proposition 6 is changing with N. That is, as N increases, ω∗
N varies,
and so the probability ratio in Equation 8 may also increase. Therefore, although this proposition
details the necessary and suﬃcient condition for N, it does not provide a tighter unconditional
bound than Proposition 1.
4.2 Generalized Product Market Competition
Now let us consider more general models of competition. That is, consider a model in which ﬁrm
entry reduces the value of competing ﬁrms in a more sophisticated way than the simple 1
N rule








for some decreasing sequence {αN}. Note that if αN decreases rapidly, then ﬁrm entry has a
dramatic eﬀect on the revenue of competing ﬁrms. If αN decreases more slowly, then the eﬀect is
less pronounced.






> 1 − pˆ ω,
then there exists some N ∈ R such that N > N ⇒ ω∗
N+1 < ω∗
N
The proof follows nearly the same structure as the proof of Proposition 6. Note, however, that
in this case, we need an additional restriction on the sequence {αN} in order to complete the proof.
Roughly stated, the requirement above is that competition not reduce ﬁrm value too “quickly” as
additional ﬁrms enter.
Thus, the question becomes one of whether the per-ﬁrm revenue can decrease ad-inﬁnitum at
such a rate with the entry of additional ﬁrms. Although one can posit such a model, exponentially
decreasing revenue is not a common feature of microeconomic models of competition.
Example 2. Consider a Cournot competition with linear pricing. In such a model, per-ﬁrm earn-
ings (and hence ﬁrm value) declines as N grows:
πN =
π1
N2. Therefore αN =
1
N2








(N + 1)2 = 1 > 1 − pˆ ω,
So under linear Cournot competition, disclosure does indeed decline with competition for large N.
5 Concluding Remarks
The primary result in this paper is that increased competition for attention in ﬁnancial markets
reduces disclosure in well-populated industries. We show this both in a parsimonious model, as
well as in more sophisticated extensions. The fundamental idea, that ﬁrm entry makes attaining
top status more diﬃcult, is straightforward. But the exponential relationship between the number
of competing ﬁrms and the probability of winning the prize is mathematically powerful. The result
is a robustness that makes our central result widely generalizable.
As our model shows, we cannot appeal to the Invisible Hand to make markets transparent.
While competition in product markets often has a favorable eﬀect on prices, driving ﬁrms to lower
and more socially eﬃcient prices, it can have the opposite eﬀect on disclosure. Speciﬁcally, when
a large part of the ﬁrm incentive to disclose is due to the prize value of high status, the entry of
additional ﬁrms can reduce this incentive. In the asymptotic limit of perfect competition, prices
converge to their most eﬃcient values, but disclosure falls to its least eﬃcient.
Our analysis in this paper can be applied to debates regarding disclosure that have evolved
following the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Indeed, terms like “sub-prime mortgage” and “collateralized
debt obligation” became household language and massive devaluations made these “toxic assets”
infamous in the eyes of the public. Investors and regulators were eager to know ﬁrms’ exposure to
these assets, but many ﬁrms did not know their own positions. This maps well onto our model, since
investors could not be certain which ﬁrms accurately knew the contents of their balance sheets.
Informed ﬁrms could choose either to conceal their asset positions, or to disclose the gruesome
details. Financial markets might have been able to right themselves more quickly had the position
of insured and insuring ﬁrms been known to investors. A great deal of media and political attention
has focused on the need to mitigate or avoid such problems in the future.
While past models have focused on the “Lemons Problem” of corporate disclosure, little atten-
tion has been paid to the exogenous beneﬁts of positive investor attention. Essentially, existing
disclosure theory casts disclosures from Wells Fargo in the same light as disclosures from a local
grocer. But in ﬁnancial sectors, where investor attention and high status make a large contribution
20to ﬁrm value, the comparison is simply inappropriate. If ﬁrms do in fact take the beneﬁts of status
into account when considering discretionary disclosure, then we can make meaningful predictions
about their actions. Understanding the incentives for disclosure allow meaningful predictions to be
made about its comparative statics. When economic conditions can change rapidly, such an un-
derstanding is critical for investors, managers, and regulators alike. In a crisis, our model predicts
that ﬁrms that compete for large prizes will be less inclined to disclose, owing to the increased
asymmetric information. Further, while the increase in uncertainty will certainly aﬀect disclosure,
it is the speciﬁcs of the distribution of new information that determine whether a second-order
stochastic shift will lead to greater or lesser transparency.
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25Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose ﬁrm j observes the event x. In a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, the ﬁrm must dis-
close optimally given the value of x. That is, it discloses when uD
j (x) > uC




If the ﬁrm discloses, then it is eligible to with the prize φ. So its new market valuation is x,
plus an additional φ if no competing ﬁrm makes a higher disclosure,
uD
j (x) = x + φWj(x),
















j (x) is diﬀerentiable, and therefore continuous. Furthermore, for any x,
uD
j (x) ≤ x + φ and x ≤ uD
j (x)
Evaluating at x = uC
j − φ and x = uC
j , these inequalities yield
uD
j (uC





So if ﬁrm j observes xj = uC
j − φ, then disclosure yields a lower expected utility than uC
j ; and if it
observes xj = uC
j , then disclosure yields a higher expected utility than uC
j . Because uD
j (x) is contin-





j (tj) = uC
j . (A2)
This tj is the disclosure threshold for ﬁrm j, where the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between disclosing and
pooling. Since uD
j (x) is strictly monotonic in x, we further obtain
x > tj ⇒ uD
j (x) > uC
j
x < tj ⇒ uD
j (x) < uC
j .
The subgame-optimal response of ﬁrm j is therefore to disclose any values above the threshold tj
and to conceal any values below, as desired.
26Now to show that tj < 0, we derive the value uC
j that investors assign if the ﬁrm conceals its
observation. In a rational expectations equilibrium, the beliefs of the investors with respect to the
strategy must be consistent with the strategy actually used,
uC
j = E[x|Pj] =
P(Uj)E[x|Uj] + P(Ij ∩ Cj)E[x|Ij ∩ Cj]
P(Uj) + P(Ij)P(Cj|Ij)
=
(1 − p)   0 + pP(x < tj)E[x|x < tj]
(1 − p) + pP(x < tj)
=
pF(tj)
1 − p + pF(tj)
E[x|x < tj] (A3)
<
pF(tj)
1 − p + pF(tj)
E[x] = 0.
∴ uC
j < 0 < uD
j (0). (A4)
Because uD
j (x) is monotonically increasing in x, the threshold tj must be below zero. That is, all
average or better values of x will be disclosed in equilibrium.  
Proof of Lemma 2






























Using this expression, some algebraic manipulation transforms uD
j (tj) = uC
j into




Now suppose for contradiction that a non-symmetric equilibrium exists. That is, suppose an
equilibrium exists in which ﬁrms j and k use diﬀerent thresholds. Without loss of generality, assume
that tk < tj. Equation (A6) holds for ﬁrm k as well as for j. Subtracting these yields
φ
￿
Wj(tj)(1 − p + pF(tj) − Wk(tk)(1 − p + pF(tk))
￿
= (1 − p)(−tj + tk) − p
Z tj
tk
F(x) dx < 0.
∴ Wj(tj)(1 − p + pF(tj)) < Wk(tk)(1 − p + pF(tk)). (A7)
27But we can obtain a contradiction by deriving the opposite inequality. We simplify Equation (A1)
































The same holds for ﬁrm k, so we obtain
Wk(tk) =
￿











Since tj > tk, these equations show that Wj(tj) > Wk(tk). Therefore,
Wj(tj)
￿




1 − p + pF(tk)
￿
.
This directly contradicts Equation (A7), so the hypothesized asymmetric equilibrium cannot exist.
 
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose for contradiction there exist two distinct equilibrium thresholds t∗ and t∗∗. Without loss









1 − p + pF(t∗∗)
￿￿
= (1 − p)(t∗∗ − t∗) + p
Z t∗
t∗∗
F(x) dx < 0.
∴ W(t∗)
￿




1 − p + pF(t∗∗)
￿
. (A9)
We now obtain a contraction by deriving the opposite inequality. Since strategies are symmetric,
ti = tj in Equation (A8), so the equation simpliﬁes to
W(t∗) =
￿
1 − p + pF(t∗)
￿N−1. (A10)
And the same holds for the other equilibrium threshold,
W(t∗∗) =
￿
1 − p + pF(t∗∗)
￿N−1.
Because t∗ > t∗∗, these equations show that W(t∗) > W(t∗∗). Therefore,
W(t∗)
￿




1 − p + pF(t∗∗)
￿
,
directly contradicting Equation (A9). By this contradiction, we conclude that a second distinct
equilibrium threshold t∗∗ cannot exist.  
28Proof of Proposition 1
Taken together, Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 show that all ﬁrms use a common and unique disclosure
threshold deﬁned implicitly by
uD
j (t∗) = uC(t∗).
We expand this equivalence using uD
j (t∗) = t∗ + φW(t∗), Equation (A10), and Equation (A5) to
obtain the desired expression
t∗ + φ
￿
1 − p + pF(t∗)
￿N−1 =
p




Finally, we ﬁnd t∗ < 0 by the same argument that shows tj < 0 in Lemma 1.  
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the integral in the right hand side of Equation (1). The substitution Ω = 1−F(x) yields







F−1(1 − Ω)(− dΩ) = −
Z ω∗
1
F−1(1 − Ω) dΩ =
Z 1
ω∗
F−1(1 − Ω) dΩ.
Equation (1) therefore becomes the desired expression,





F−1(1 − Ω) dΩ.
 
Deﬁnition A1. For any disclosure frequency ω, deﬁne the corresponding disclosure threshold by
t(ω). That is,
t(ω) ≡ F−1(1 − ω)
Deﬁnition A2. Deﬁne B(ω) as the beneﬁt of disclosing the threshold value relative to concealing,
assuming that all ﬁrms disclose with frequency ω,
B(ω) ≡ uD(ω) − uC(ω),
where
uD(ω) ≡ E[uD
j |xj = t(ω)]
uC(ω) ≡ E[xj|Pj,tj = t(ω)].
29Note that this deﬁnition does not require that ω be the equilibrium frequency, which we denote
distinctly by ω∗.
Lemma A1. The equilibrium disclosure frequency is deﬁned implicitly by
B(ω∗) = 0.
Further, for any ω > ˆ ω,
(i) ∂B
∂ω < 0
(ii) B(ω) > 0 ⇒ ω < ω∗
(iii) B(ω) < 0 ⇒ ω > ω∗
Proof of Lemma A1
Using Deﬁnitions A1 and A2, we can write B(ω) as






Comparing this to Corollary 2 reveals that B(ω∗) = 0 is algebraically equivalent to Equation 3. So
























ω t(Ω) d(Ω) + pt(ω)(1 − pω)
(1 − pω)2
and the integrand t(Ω) is decreasing in Ω, so
... <
−p2(1 − ω)t(ω) + pt(ω)(1 − pω)
(1 − pω)2
=
−p2 + p2ω + p − p2ω




By our assumption that ω > ˆ ω, we know that t(ω) < ˆ t < E[˜ x] = 0, and so the derivative of
the third term is also negative. Thus, B(ω) is strictly decreasing in ω for all ω > ˆ ω.
30(ii) Since ω∗ > ˆ ω, ∂B/∂ω < 0. So because B(ω∗) = 0, we have






The contrapositive of this statement is the desired expression,
B(ω) > 0 ⇒ ω < ω∗.
(iii) Proven as in part (ii).
 
Proof of Proposition 3
For clarity, let us write B(ω) ≡ uD(ω) − uC(ω) explicitly in terms of the model parameters:






For any set of parameter values (φ,p,N), the equilibrium disclosure frequency is uniquely deﬁned by
B(ω∗,φ,p,N) = 0. Because B is diﬀerentiable with respect to each of its parameters, the Implicit
Function Theorem tells us how the equilibrium frequency changes with the parameter values. For






















Lemma A1 tells us that ∂B




= (1 − pω)N−1 > 0
∂B
∂N
= φ(1 − pω)N−1 ln(1 − pω) < 0
∂B
∂p








ω t(Ω) dΩ < 0 is the expected value of x for a non-disclosing ﬁrm, which is negative.
So the second term of ∂B
∂p is positive, while the ﬁrst is negative. Which term dominates depends
on the parameter values.



















31As shown already, ω is decreasing in N. Since any monotonic bounded sequence of real numbers
converges9, and since we know ω∗
N > ˆ ω for all N, ω∗





The function B( ) is continuous in ω∗
N and N, and BN(ω∗
N) = 0 for all N. The sequence
{BN(ω∗


































and therefore ω∞ = ˆ ω.  
Proof of Proposition 4
Deﬁne a ﬁrm’s “rank” according to the ﬁrms place among realized disclosures by competing ﬁrms.
That is, if there are k − 1 higher disclosures, the ﬁrm has rank k and receives φk. A disclosing
ﬁrm’s rank is therefore a stochastic function of its disclosed value. We deﬁne ˜ r(ω) accordingly:
˜ r(ω) = rank of a ﬁrm that discloses x = F−1(1 − ω).
Using this notation, we would write the expected utility of disclosure in the base model as
uD(ω) = t(ω) + φW(ω)
= t(ω) + φP
￿
˜ r(ω) = 1
￿
. (Single Prize φ)
With prizes for the top K ﬁrms, the expected payout becomes





˜ r(ω) = k
￿
. (Multiple Prizes {φk})
We wish to show that this value is decreasing in N. Unfortunately, we cannot claim that P(˜ r(ω) = k)
is decreasing in N without some further restrictions. Although the chance of having at least the
9Rudin, Theorem 3.14, “Principles of Mathematical Analysis.”
32kth-highest disclosure is strictly decreasing in N, the chance of having exactly the kth-highest dis-
closure may be increasing in N, at least for certain parameter values. We therefore rearrange the
sum in order to write it in terms we know to be unconditionally decreasing in N,























˜ r(ω) ≤ k
￿
, the probability of having at least the kth-highest disclosure, is strictly
decreasing in N. Since prizes are strictly decreasing in rank, we also have (φk−φk+1) > 0. Therefore,
uD(ω) is unconditionally decreasing in N. We conclude that disclosure frequency decreases in N
under a progressive prize structure.  
Proof of Proposition 5
We consider the base model with prizes φN that increase with N according to some sequence {φN}.
Then the beneﬁt of disclosing relative to concealing is a function of N,
BN(ω) = t(ω) + φN(1 − pω)N−1 − uC(ω).
The same holds for (N + 1) ﬁrms, so we can subtract the two equations to obtain
BN+1(ω) − BN(ω) = φN+1(1 − pω)N − φN(1 − pω)N−1




(1 − pω) − 1
￿
. (A16)
Under our assumption that limN→∞
φN+1
φN < 1
1−pˆ ω, there exists some N such that





1 − pˆ ω
,
so evaluating Equation (A16) at ω = ω∗
N for any N > N yields
BN+1(ω∗





(1 − pˆ ω) − 1
￿
< 0.
By Lemma A1, we obtain the desired ω∗
N+1 < ω∗
N.  
Lemma A2. Under equal shares competition, the signal that corresponds to a given probability ω,















x(ω) + φ(1 − pω)N−1. (A19)
Proof of Lemma A2
Under the deﬁnition,
FN(x) = F(Nx),


















so for p = 1 − ω, we have
F−1








Using this ﬁrst result, the others follow quickly
uD
























(i) This follows immediately from our deﬁnition FN(x) ≡ F(Nx). As N → ∞, FN(x) → F(0)
for every x ∈ R.
34(ii) For any N > 1
pˆ ω, Proposition 1 tells us that ω∗
N is decreasing in N. Since any monotonic
bounded sequence of real numbers converges10, and since we know ω∗
N > ˆ ω for all N, ω∗
N





The function B( ) is continuous in ω∗
N and N, and BN(ω∗
N) = 0 for all N. The sequence
{BN(ω∗


































and therefore ω∞ = ˆ ω.
 
Proof of Proposition 1
Note: This proof calls upon Proposition 6, which comes next in the appendix. Clearly P(Pj|N) < 1,
so
NP(Dj|N) > 1 ⇒ NP(Dj|N) > P(Pj|N),
which implies ω∗
N+1 < ω∗





⇒ NP(Dj|N) > 1.
 
Proof of Proposition 6











∴ NBN(ω) = t(ω) + Nφ(1 − pω)N−1 − uC(ω). (A25)
10Rudin, Theorem 3.14, “Principles of Mathematical Analysis.”
35The same holds for N + 1. That is,
(N + 1)BN+1(ω) = t(ω) + (N + 1)φ(1 − pω)N − uC(ω). (A26)
Subtracting Equation (A25) from Equation (A26) yields
(N + 1)BN+1(ω) − NBN(ω) = (N + 1)φ(1 − pω)N − Nφ(1 − pω)N−1
= φ(1 − pω)N−1￿
(N + 1)(1 − pω) − N
￿
= φ(1 − pω)N−1￿
N + 1 − Npω − pω − N
￿
= φ(1 − pω)N−1￿
(1 − pω) − Npω
￿
. (A27)
If we at ω = ω∗
N, then BN(ω∗



















N) < 0 ⇒ ω∗
N+1 < ω∗
N, (A28)
where the second implication is due to Lemma A1. That is, disclosure at the frequency ω∗
N gives
B < 0, so the marginal disclosure loses value. The equilibrium frequency ω∗
N+1 must be lower.
This shows that the entry of the (N +1)th ﬁrm reduces disclosure when N is large. When N is
smaller than the threshold, the inequalities in Equation (A28) are reversed, as shown by the same
logic. This completes the equivalence.
Finally, note that the ex ante probability of a ﬁrm j disclosing is the joint probability that it
observes xj and that xj exceeds its threshold. Given the number of competing ﬁrms, this means
P(Dj|N) = pω∗
N and P(Pj|N) = 1 − pω∗
N,
so the same equivalency holds using the threshold N >
P(Pj|N)
P(Dj|N), as desired.  
Proof of Proposition 7
Under generalized competition with N ﬁrms, we have
BN(ω) = tN(ω) + φ(1 − pω)N−1 − uC
N(ω)




BN(ω) = t(ω) +
1
αN
φ(1 − pω)N−1 − uC(ω).
























N and rearranging terms yields
BN+1(ω∗









Under our assumption that limN→∞
αN+1
αN > 1 − pˆ ω, there exists some N such that
N > N ⇒
αN+1
αN
> 1 − pˆ ω.
So for N > N, we obtain
BN+1(ω∗












N) − (1 − pˆ ω)
￿
= (1 − pω∗




By Lemma A1, we conclude that ω∗
N+1 < ω∗
N, as desired.  
37Appendix B
In this appendix, we present several extensions and alternative model formulations to further
show the robustness of our results under perfect competition. First, we consider endogenous prizes
and prizes that are based on ﬁrm percentile. Following that, we explore a sequential disclosure
model in which ﬁrms take turns making disclosures, based on what others have done previously.
Finally, we conclude the appendix with a numerical analysis of the eﬀect of volatility on disclosure.
B.1 Endogenous Prizes
Our analysis in the body of the paper assumes that the prize is given exogenously. One might ask
whether the analysis is robust to considering that residual claimants (e.g., lenders, suppliers, or
labor) set an industry prize optimally to maximize proﬁts. While a full treatment of this is outside
the scope of this paper, we present the following two-stage game to show that perfect competition
still leads to decreased disclosure when endogenous prizes are awarded.
Let us consider that the residual claimant’s goal in awarding the prize is to eﬃciently allocate
a scarce resource (e.g., loans, supplies, labor). Speciﬁcally, we consider that the residual claimant
can do business with at most j < N ﬁrms and wishes to screen potential trading partners via the
disclosure process. For any ﬁrm that exceeds a threshold x, the ﬁrm is said to be suﬃciently solid
to be a trading partner. Note that in equilibrium, x < t or vice versa.
We denote the beneﬁt to paying a cost φ in screening business partners as B(φ,N), which also
depends on the number of ﬁrms in the market. The game takes place in two stages. At T = 1, the
residual claimant solves the following problem
max
φ∈[0,φ]
B(φ,N) − φ, (B1)
which is equivalent to maximizing their economic welfare subject to some bound on the magnitude
of the prize they can award (e.g., cost of funds, cost of supplies, reservation wage). At T = 2, the
rest of the disclosure game takes place as in Section 2 of the paper.
The following proposition characterizes the solution to this problem under perfect competition.
Proposition B1. As N → ∞, ω∗ → ˆ ω.
Proof. Consider that the residual claimant wishes to screen ﬁrms according to a particular x < 0.
By construction, the probability that ˜ x > 0 for a particular ﬁrm is ω. Deﬁne the Mj to be the
probability that at least j ﬁrms out of the total N draw a value of at least ˜ x = 0. As N → ∞,
Mj → 1. This implies that B(φ,N) → 0 as N → ∞. This, in turn, implies that when the residual
38claimant solves (B1), φ∗ → 0 as N → ∞. Hence, as N → ∞, ω∗
N → ˆ ω. Finally, the same logic
holds for x > 0.  
The intuition for Proposition B1 is as follows. As the number of ﬁrms rises to a large number,
the probability that the residual claimant can identify j ﬁrms that exceed any particular threshold
x approaches one. In particular, the probability that the residual claimant can identify j ﬁrms
whose disclosure exceeds x = 0 approaches one. Therefore, the need for a prize decreases when
there are more ﬁrms present in the market. That is, since B(φ,N) becomes small for large N, the
solution to (B1) φ∗ diminishes in size. According to our previous analysis in Proposition 3, this
implies that disclosure frequency is minimized (i.e., ω∗ → ˆ ω).
It is fair to point out that this result does depend on the absence of product market competition,
which we analyzed in Section 4. It also depends on the assumption that there is a representative
residual claimant (as opposed to a strategic interaction among claimants). Notwithstanding this,
though, it is clear that our primary result can remain robust even when considering at least one
reasonable setting in which the prize is set optimally and endogenously.
B.2 Prizes based on percentiles
Rather than awarding a ﬁxed number of prizes, we can instead use a ﬁrm’s relative ranking. For
example, each ﬁrm in the top 20% of the N ﬁrms could be awarded a prize. That is, the N/5
highest disclosures each receive an additional φ. We again ﬁnd that disclosure decreases to its
minimum possible frequency in the limit of perfect competition.
This variation introduces some complications that prevent us from showing the claim from
the main model, “equilibrium disclosure ω∗
N is strictly decreasing in N.” Because the number of
prizes is discrete, it cannot increase in exact proportion with N. When 20% of the ﬁrms receive
a prize, for example, a single prize is awarded when N = 5,6,7,8,9, and we numerically ﬁnd that
ω∗
5 > ω∗
6 > ... > ω∗
9. But for N = 10 we suddenly award a second prize, which can mean that
ω∗
9 < ω∗
10. We must therefore content ourselves with the perfect competition limit result below.
Proposition B2. Suppose that for any N, a ﬁxed fraction λ of the competing ﬁrms win the prize
φ. Further, suppose that λ ≤ pˆ ω. Then disclosure converges to its lower bound in the perfectly
competitive limit:
ω∗
N −→ ˆ ω as N → ∞.
Proof. Let t∗
N be the equilibrium disclosure threshold with N ﬁrms. Suppose that a ﬁrm j observes
and discloses exactly xj = t∗
N. Then the probability q that any other given opponent observes a
39higher value is given by
q ≡ p(1 − F (t∗
N)) = pω∗
N.
Any such realization above the threshold will certainly be disclosed, so the number of ﬁrms who
disclose values higher than t∗
N is a binomial random variable ˜ S ∼ B(N,q). The probability that
ﬁrm j wins a prize is bounded by the probability that fewer than λN other ﬁrms disclose values




˜ S ≤ λN − 1
￿
.
This probability is the weight of a left tail of the binomial distribution of ˜ S. We may bound it using
Hoeﬀding’s inequality (Hoeﬀding, 1963), which states that the sum ˜ s, of any N random variables,
has the probabilistic bound







where the ith random variable is contained by the interval [ai,bi]. In our application, ˜ S is the sum
of (N − 1) identically-distributed Bernoulli trials with success probability q, so




= q(N − 1).




















￿ ￿ ≥ (q − λ)N − q + 1
￿
.










Note that ﬁrms will always disclose values above ˆ t, so any equilibrium threshold t∗
N must be below
ˆ t. We therefore have







= pˆ ω > λ.
This ensures that as N → ∞, the exponential in (B3) goes to −∞ and the right hand side goes to
zero for any sequence of thresholds {t∗
N}. Since ﬁrms optimally respond to W = 0 by concealing
all realizations below ˆ t, the disclosure frequency converges to ˆ ω, as desired.  
40According to Proposition B2, as the market becomes perfectly competitive, disclosure is mini-
mized. It should be noted that the condition that λ < pˆ ω is weak in the sense that it allows for a
large number of ﬁrms to receive prizes. If λ = pˆ ω when N → ∞, this would mean that all ﬁrms that
observed a value above ˆ t would receive a prize. Therefore, we limit the fraction of prizes (λ < pˆ ω)
to keep the analysis realistic and economically interesting.
B.3 Sequential Disclosure
As a further robustness check, consider an alternate model speciﬁcation in which ﬁrms act sequen-
tially instead of simultaneously. Firms are randomly ordered, and each in turn observes its shock
value ˜ x with probability p, then chooses whether to disclose.
Since each ﬁrm makes a unique, history-dependent decision, we no longer have a single symmet-
ric, deterministic disclosure threshold. Rather, each ﬁrm will have a random disclosure threshold
that depends upon the disclosures of the preceding ﬁrms and on the number of ﬁrms remaining to
act. Let νj be the ex ante probability that the jth ﬁrm to act will disclose if they are informed.







In the perfectly-competitive limit, we can show that every individual jth ﬁrm discloses with
frequency ˆ ω, the minimum possible. We can also show the slightly stronger claim that the average
frequency of disclosure over all N ﬁrms converges to the minimum ˆ ω.
Proposition B3. In sequential equilibrium with N ﬁrms,




νj = ˆ ω.
(ii) The ex ante probability that a randomly selected informed ﬁrm discloses also converges to the
minimum with perfect competition:
lim
N→∞
¯ νN = ˆ ω.
Proof. By our deﬁnition of ˆ t, any ﬁrm with a realization xj > ˆ t discloses even if they have no
chance of winning the prize. This establishes a lower bound for both limits:
lim
N→∞
νj ≥ ˆ ω and lim
N→∞
¯ νN ≥ ˆ ω. (B4)
41(i) Suppose ﬁrm j discloses a lower value, xj < ˆ t. If any of the N − j ﬁrms yet to act observes
a value above ˆ t, they will certainly disclose it. The probability that ﬁrm j wins the prize is
therefore bounded above by








1 − F(ˆ t)
￿￿N−j
= (1 − pˆ ω)
N−j .
So as N → ∞, the probability of winning the prize converges to zero. In this limit, so ﬁrm
j will optimally conceal any values below ˆ t, disclosing no more frequently than ˆ ω. Together
with (B4), this establishes the desired result.
(ii) Again, note that a ﬁrm that realizes xj < ˆ t will not disclose unless it has a positive probability
of winning the prize. Speciﬁcally, it will not disclose if any preceding ﬁrm has already disclosed
a value above ˆ t. That is, the probability of disclosing a value below ˆ t cannot possibly be larger
than the probability that no preceding ﬁrm i has disclosed xi > ˆ t. This allows us to place a
very loose upper bound on νj:
νj = P(˜ xj < ˆ t)   P(Dj|xj < ˆ t) + P
￿
Dj|xj > ˆ t
￿
  P(˜ xj > ˆ t)
≤ (1 − ˆ ω)  
j−1 Y
i=1
P(Ui or xi < ˆ t) + ˆ ω   1
= (1 − ˆ ω)(1 − pω)j−1 + ˆ ω.







(1 − ˆ ω)(1 − pˆ ω)j−1 + ˆ ω
￿




1 − (1 − pˆ ω)N




1 − ˆ ω
pˆ ω
￿




As N → ∞, the ﬁrst term vanishes, so limN→∞ ¯ νN ≤ ˆ ω. Together with (B4), this yields the
desired result.
 
B.4 Volatility and Disclosure
We now consider the eﬀect of an exogenous distribution change on disclosure, speciﬁcally an increase
in volatility. When volatility suddenly increases, inside information becomes more signiﬁcant as
larger deviations from past beliefs become possible, and larger swings in ﬁrm prices may result.
42We incorporate an increase in volatility into our analysis by examining the eﬀect of a noisier, or
second-order stochastically dominated distribution. Firms and investors realize that they do not
know the relevant facts as precisely as they had believed, so new information acquisitions take on
a greater signiﬁcance, and larger surprises become more likely. We assume that investors are aware
of the regime change, although the signals ﬁrms receive will still be private.
We consider a shift from the prior distribution ˜ x ∼ F to a new distribution ˜ x ∼ G, where F
stochastically dominates G in second order. Intuitively, the shift from F to G makes rare events
more likely. This increases the informational advantage of ﬁrms, since the events they observe are
likely to be more signiﬁcant, due to the new distribution’s increased variance.
As we have noted before, Jung and Kwon (1988) reﬁne the Dye (1985) model, which is similar to
our model, except that they enforce N = 1 and φ = 0, and they allow a non-zero mean of information
events E[x]  = 0. In their setting, they show that if F stochastically dominates G in second order,
then t∗
G > t∗
F. That is, a noisier distribution induces a higher threshold. We show, however, that
this increase in t∗ need not imply an increase in ω∗. That is, because the distribution itself has
changed, the higher disclosure threshold may nevertheless yield a lower disclosure frequency.
Since ﬁnding a closed-form solution for the disclosure frequency ranges from diﬃcult to impos-
sible, we oﬀer proof of this assertion in the form of the following numerical examples.








+ x + 0.5.
Distribution F(x) has nearly all of its density located around zero. A realization around the
mean is almost a sure bet and ﬁrms with that or anything above are quick to disclose. Firms that
do not disclose are those that receive the rare realizations in the left tail.
In a time of increased uncertainty, the distribution could become G(x) instead. This is an
increase in volatility in which the density at the mean shifts to the tails. Note that this distri-
bution has the same mean signal x, but much greater variance. We say that the distribution F
stochastically dominates G in second order.
We determine disclosure behavior numerically for the sample parameter values below. Since
the situations we describe above could occur with or without a prize φ, we present the results in
both cases:
Investors know there are few intermediate realizations under G(x), i.e. that the majority of the




















































Table 1: More Volatility; Less Disclosure
Distribution p φ N t∗ ω∗
F(x) 0.7 0 1 -0.0008 0.6834
G(x) 0.7 0 1 -0.1910 0.5427
F(x) 0.7 0.10 5 -0.0023 0.9072
G(x) 0.7 0.10 5 -0.2050 0.5522
tions, because investors will assign some probability that they are an extremely high valued ﬁrm.
Disclosure frequency decreases as a result.
Example 2: More Volatility: More disclosure
Compare two distributions:




+ x + 0.5.
Here we consider a shift from a uniform distribution to one with mass in the middle and the
tails. This represents a situation where the initial uniformly distributed information is trumped
by a larger development that may or may not aﬀect the ﬁrm. This might the case if, for example,
investors are uncertain of whether a particular asset is even present on a ﬁrm’s balance sheet, and
also uncertain as to the value of the asset itself. The central mode represents the possibility that
the ﬁrm does not own the asset, and the tails represent owning the asset and its value being either
high or low.
Graphically, it can be seen that F(x) second-order stochastically dominates G(x). Again,
the disclosure threshold level is certainly lower under distribution G(x). But unlike the previous
example, we show that the change in frequency is higher. The addition of competition for a prize
























































Table 2: SOSD Numerical Results
Distribution p φ N t∗ ω∗
F(x) 0.7 0 1 -0.1460 0.6460
G(x) 0.7 0 1 -0.1572 0.7303
F(x) 0.7 0.10 5 -0.1544 0.6544
G(x) 0.7 0.10 5 -0.1630 0.7337
45